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 1. Introduction  
 
The global financial crisis of 2007-? is in many respects unparalleled. Compared to the 
current crisis, recent financial crises such as the 1997 East Asian crisis or the 1998 crisis 
associated with the collapse of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) and the Russian 
bond default had a very much more muted global impact. Of course, these events sent 
shock waves through global financial markets, but the main damage was fairly contained.  
It is safe to say that the crisis beginning in 2007 is unlike anything anyone working today 
has ever lived through before. As a result, it is important to chronicle the major events 
that have unfolded and their implications. 
  In this paper, we focus our attention on the foreign exchange (FX) market. Given 
the relatively low transparency of this market compared to equities and fixed income, it is 
important to draw on knowledge possessed by market “insiders.” There have been many 
days of shocking events that have occurred since August 2007 and it is not easy for 
scholars to appreciate fully the magnitude of the dislocations that have occurred in the FX 
market. We hope successfully to combine our practitioner insights with the discipline of 
scholars in order to present a useful analysis of what happened and its importance.  
  In Section 2 we provide an overview of the important events of the crisis and their 
implications for exchange rates and market dynamics; the goal is to catalogue all that was 
truly of major importance in this episode. In Section 3 we construct a quantitative 
measure of crises that allows for a comparison of the current crisis to earlier events. In 
addition, we address whether one could have predicted costly events before they 
happened in a manner that would have allowed market participants to moderate their risk 
  1exposures and yield better returns from currency speculation.  In Section 4 we provides a 
summary and conclusions. 
 
2. Crisis Timeline 
The crisis in FX came relatively late. In the early summer of 2007, it was apparent that 
fixed income markets were under considerable stress. Then, in July 2007 equity markets 
appeared to experience remarkable volatility. In particular, supposedly market-neutral 
equity portfolios suffered huge losses and it was common to hear people referring to a 
“five (or larger) standard deviation event”.  FX market participants watched these other 
markets with growing trepidation, wondering when, if and how the market turbulence 
would extend to exchange rates. Their fears were met on August 16, 2007: on this date a 
major unwinding of the carry trade occurred and many currency market investors 
suffered huge losses. As a result, we date the beginning of the crisis in the FX market as 
August 2007.   
 
2.1  August 2007: Contagion from other asset classes and the Carry Trade 
A very popular strategy for currency investors is the so-called “carry trade.”  This is a 
strategy of buying, or taking a long position, in high-interest rate currencies, funded by 
selling, or taking a short position, in low-interest rate currencies. For instance, in the 
summer of 2007, many currency investors were short Japanese yen (JPY) and long 
Australian and New Zealand dollars (AUD and NZD). Interest rate parity (IRP) suggests 
that the interest differential between two currencies should be offset by a change in the 
exchange rates. A carry trade investor bets that this exchange rate offset will not occur so 
  2that the interest differential is earned. So while IRP suggests that, with a low interest rate 
JPY and a high interest rate NZD, one should observe JPY appreciation relative to the 
NZD. However, there is a large literature indicating that, in fact, it is often the case that 
the low interest rate currency actually depreciates rather than appreciates against the high 
interest rate currency. Such an exchange rate movement results in even larger carry trade 
profits.  
  Carry trades tend to unwind during conditions of market stress and relatively 
modest unwinds have been seen historically once or twice a year on average.  Prior to 
2007, the most recent major carry trade unwind was in October 1998 following a Russian 
bond default and the collapse of Long Term Capital Management.
1 The carry trade 
unwind occurring on August 16, 2007 was as devastating for many currency managers as 
was the 1998 episode: the one-day change in the JPY price of the AUD on August 16, 
2007 was -7.7 percent, compare to the average daily change in that exchange rate for 
2007 prior to August 15 of only 0.7 percent.  
  Figure 1 displays the returns to the carry trade in 2007 as measured by Deutsche 
Bank’s Carry Index. Deutsche Bank computes the returns to a portfolio that is long the 
three highest yielding currencies and short the three lowest yielding currencies across the 
developed markets. There was a brief period of carry unwind in late-February, early-
March associated with an emerging market sell-off that followed a sharp drop in Chinese 
equity prices. This brief carry unwind was followed by a long run of excellent returns to 
the carry trade that peaked on July 25. Throughout early August, carry traders 
experienced a drawdown that culminated in the bloodbath that occurred on August 16. 
The trough of the return to carry occurred on August 17 and then there was a period of 
                                                 
1 For a description of this episode see Cai, Cheung, Lee, and Melvin (2001). 
  3positive carry-trade performance until November. We therefore identify November as the 
second stage of the crisis in the FX market. 
 
What caused the carry trade unwind? 
  Before discussing November, it is important to ask what triggered the carry 
unwind in August 2007. The volatility in currency markets followed heightened volatility 
in other asset classes. Due to losses sustained in fixed income and equity portfolios, it is 
not surprising that a deleveraging occurred in currency portfolios. Risk appetite fell and 
investors sought to reduce the size of their exposures to risky trades like the carry trade. 
This all followed the fallout from the U.S. subprime home loan debacle where the quality 
of bank loan portfolios became increasingly suspect. Market participants were beginning 
to discount the degree to which the U.S. subprime problem would become a global issue. 
Risk concerns drove some investors to reduce their mandates with fund managers who 
had large subprime exposures. A notable event was the announcement by the hedge fund 
Sentinel that they were suspending redemptions due to a lack of liquidity. While such 
announcements were to become fairly commonplace later, August 2007 was still early in 
the crisis and for a fund manager to inform clients that they could not withdraw their 
investments sent ripples of fear through the market and reduced risk appetite further.  
  It is notable, however, that the carry trade unwind of August 2007 was fairly brief 
as risk came back on later in the month and it appeared that investors viewed the worst as 
having passed, so that there was the appearance of a move towards more normal market 
conditions. Beyond the returns to the carry trade depicted in Figure 1, the pattern of 
turmoil in the FX market is reflected well in the implied volatility from option prices. 
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options. This is an interesting exchange rate volatility to study as this is a popular carry 
trade pair (long AUD, short JPY). Prior to the crisis, if we looked further back in history, 
we would see a level of volatility of around 8 percent. In August 2007, volatility began to 
rise and then mid-month the volatility spiked up to 28 percent. As mentioned above, the 
period of carry unwind and crisis appeared to end quickly so that volatility fell over 
September and into October. This period of relative calm was about to end in the month 
of November.  
 
2.2 November 2007: Credit, Commodities, and Deleveraging 
The second leg of the crisis in currency markets arrived in early November 2007. Figure 
1 indicates that the return of the carry trade profitability came to an abrupt halt on 
November 7. The perception that the world was moving back toward normality had 
encouraged investors to increase carry trade exposures as the August turmoil faded into 
the past, but the carry unwind that occurred in November was a stark signal that the crisis 
was still alive and well. The sell-off of high-yielding currencies was reflected in the 
AUD-JPY, which moved from a local high of 106.05 on November 7, to 96.17 by 
November 12, a drop of about 9 percent.  Another view is provided in Figure 2, which 
illustrates how volatility fell following the August crisis period. While volatility remained 
elevated relative to the pre-crisis period, there had been an uneven pattern of falling 
volatility on the AUD-JPY until mid-October, when it fell below 14. Volatility then 
started to rise and jumped dramatically in the second week of November. 
 
  5Liquidity and Deleveraging 
What happened to move the crisis into its next stage? Credit concerns seem to be a major 
part of the story. Firms were finding it difficult to issue asset-backed commercial paper 
(ABCP) and ABCP yields were rising dramatically as risk appetite fell and willing 
lenders were evaporating. There was an obvious flight to quality in that yields on U.S. 
Treasury bills fell along with the rise in ABCP yields. Bank losses due to securities 
linked to subprime loans were growing. The CDX and iTRAXX indices indicated that the 
cost of insuring against default on U.S. and European bonds was growing. Some famous 
investment managers had suffered serious losses year-to-date and the end result of all this 
is that a round of pronounced deleveraging was under way. To the extent that investment 
funds were holding similar positions, when some funds (or even one large fund) sold off 
its positions, it impacted competitors who suffered losses on their portfolios and led to 
deleveraging on the part of the competitors as well. There were repeated instances of 
“forced sales,” where losses reached a point such that prime brokers were forcing some 
funds to liquidate their positions.  
  The last point is worth further consideration. Hedge funds typically use a prime 
broker to back their trades so that they stand alongside the creditworthiness of the prime 
broker in the face of their counterparties. The prime broker banks provide financing to 
the funds to allow them to obtain the leverage they desire on their investments. The prime 
brokers impose risk management controls on their clients that can trigger margin calls 
and/or liquidation of positions. Such controls or triggers could include thresholds for the 
net asset value of the fund and monthly or quarterly fund returns. If the net asset value or 
returns fall below the thresholds, this triggers an automatic call from the prime broker to 
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constrained environment, additional cash is a problem so liquidation occurs. In this 
manner, a run of bad performance may lead to a cascade of even worse performance as 
positions are unwound in an illiquid market at the worse possible time. Similarly, if 
investors choose to redeem their funds they have placed with a fund manager, the 
manager may be forced to liquidate positions in a very illiquid market and move prices 
much more than would normally occur. Some funds facing such a situation chose to 
invoke clauses that blocked the redemptions. The more this occurred, the more risk 
aversion grew among investors who feared getting stuck in their investments with no 
liquidity available. All of this contributes to the “flight to quality” away from risky 
investments and into low-risk investments like Treasury bills and cash. 
  Beyond the change in risk appetite and associated deleveraging, there was also a 
fall in commodity prices in November 2007 that reinforced the sell off in so-called 
commodity currencies like the Australian dollar and Norwegian kroner (NOK). Since 
these were also high-yielding currencies, this commodity-related selling was just piled on 
top of the carry unwinding that was ongoing. Whether an investor was long AUD or 
NOK because of high interest rates or high metals or oil prices, the end result was the 
same. Their long position suffered a significant loss as these currencies were sold. 
 
2.3 March 2008: Bear Stearns and Illiquidity 
In early March, rumors of Bear Stearns’ eminent demise began circulating. Despite 
repeated claims to the contrary by Bear executives, clients feared that the firm would not 
be able to honor commitments and so began to move their business away from Bear 
  7Stearns. This included both banks that would provide repo financing as well as prime 
brokerage clients that feared their cash would be tied up in a bankruptcy. The usual 
interbank repo sources of short-term funding available to investment banks was 
evaporating, so the Federal Reserve Bank of New York had to step in and provide a 
short-term loan to ensure that Bear did not default on any obligations. On March 11, 
Goldman Sachs allegedly informed hedge fund clients that they would assume no further 
exposure to Bear Stearns and, by the end of the day, banks were no longer willing to 
issue credit protection against Bear’s debts. On March 17, JP Morgan Chase offered to 
buy Bear for $2 per share and it was clear that the firm was soon to be taken over. On 
March 24, the revised offer of $10 per share was accepted.  
 
The Importance to “too big to fail” 
It later would prove to have been an important policy decision for the Federal Reserve to 
step in and help support the orderly takeover of Bear Stearns and avoid any defaults. In 
March 2008, one can see in Figures 1-3 that market conditions were deteriorating as fears 
over the potential failure of a large investment bank and the ripple effects that would 
have created through the resulting losses imposed on counterparties  was being priced 
into financial markets. Figure 1 indicates that prior to the realization that Bear was cut off 
from interbank funding, there was a heightened drop in risk appetite and the returns to the 
carry trade were falling. But once it was clear that Bear was considered “too big to fail” 
by the Federal Reserve and an orderly takeover by JP Morgan Chase would occur, market 
fears were calmed and the returns to the carry trade were once more positive into the 
summer period. Figure 2 illustrates that volatility in the FX market was rising with the 
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recede following the offer to buy Bear. Volatility continued to fall through late summer. 
Finally, Figure 3 shows the path of the “TED spread,” the difference between the yield on 
90 day LIBOR and the yield on 90 day U.S. Treasury bills. Since LIBOR is for unsecured 
interbank loans while U.S. Treasuries are considered to have no default risk, the TED 
spread is a measure of credit risk. Figure 3 illustrates that credit risk, as measured by the 
TED spread, rose rapidly in early March. Once it was clear that Bear would be sold and 
not go bankrupt, credit risk receded and remained fairly low through the summer.  
  The second quarter of 2008 was a period when many thought that the world was 
once again returning to a more normal state for financial markets. For the foreign 
exchange market, this was a period when risk appetite was increasing and investors were 
building positions that reflected their view that is was getting safer to speculate in FX. As 
summer drew to an end, no one expected the storm that was lying just ahead.  
 
2.4 September 2008: Lehman Brothers and Counterparty Risk 
After relative tranquility through the summer of 2008, the financial crisis soon was to 
realize its most dramatic episode, the failure of Lehman Brothers. Lehman had huge 
losses associated with the subprime mortgage business and its stock had fallen 
dramatically over the year through August. Lehman negotiated with Bank of America 
and Barclays to try to arrange a sale, but both banks declined to buy the entire company 
and bankruptcy loomed. The president of the New York Fed called a meeting on 
Saturday, September 13 to sort out Lehman’s future. When negotiations with potential 
buyers failed to produce a result, there was an exceptional trading session organized on 
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their positions in derivatives contracts. Early the next morning, Lehman’s bankruptcy 
was announced. While Bear Stearns was treated as “too big to fail” by the Federal 
Reserve and the U.S. Treasury, Lehman Brothers was not so fortunate. This ultimately 
turned out to be a disastrous decision that imposed losses on other firms across the 
industry and created turmoil not seen before.  
  The aftermath of the Lehman failure was startling in its dimensions. Figure 1 
shows how the returns to the carry trade had turned down during the summer as the 
market began to worry about the potential for a disruptive event like the failure of a major 
bank. The risk aversion and deleveraging that occurred post-Lehman were unlike 
anything that had been witnessed before. Figure 2 illustrates that volatility was also 
increasing as the summer came to an end. But following the Lehman debacle, volatility 
rose to incredible levels that made the earlier peaks in the financial crisis look small in 
comparison. Finally, Figure 3 gets to the heart of the problem—credit risk. Post-Lehman, 
there was a dramatic fear across the market as to where losses hid and who might be next 
to go under. The U.S. government had demonstrated that the market’s belief in major 
institutions being “too big to fail” was misplaced. The failure of Lehman added an 
entirely new dimension to perceptions of risk.  
 
Counterparty Risk and Liquidity 
In Figure 3, we see how the TED spread rose sharply with the news of the Lehman failure. 
As mentioned earlier, since LIBOR is a price for unsecured interbank lending, its spread 
over Treasury bills is a good indicator of the market price of credit risk. Banks were 
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knew that there were many bad assets being carried on bank balance sheets that could 
ultimately trigger another default. It was in this environment that the Federal Reserve and 
U.S. Treasury pushed for the TARP (Troubled Assets Relief Program) that was initially 
stated as a program to remove “troubled assets” from bank balance sheets and reduce the 
counterparty risk.  
  As shown in Figure 2, exchange rates experienced unprecedented levels of 
volatility. In this environment, transaction costs rose dramatically. When market makers 
provide liquidity to the market, they assume inventory positions in currencies as a result 
of their trades. They will ultimately seek to cover this inventory risk with offsetting 
trades. The greater volatility, the greater risk they face from holding positions. As a result, 
the bid-ask spread rises to compensate them for this risk. In the fall of 2008, FX spreads 
widened dramatically.  
  Table 1 provides some indicative data on how spreads changed from pre-crisis 
normal times to the 2008 post-Lehman crisis. These are indicative of spreads that might 
be quoted on a bilateral trade between two counterparties. A hedge fund might call a bank 
marketmaker and request a two-way quote on USDCHF, for instance. In the pre-crisis 
period, the quoted spot spread might be in the range of 4 “pips.” For instance, a spot trade 
could be quoted at 1.1525-1.1529. During the post-Lehman crisis period, the spread 
widened to 16 pips. In the worst of times, spreads on particular currencies were even 
wider than those suggested by Table 1. Generally spreads were at least 400 percent wider 
than what used to be considered normal.  In addition, there were times in the fall of 2008, 
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makers.  
  Even more dramatic than the spot spreads was the widening that occurred in 
spreads for forward delivery. Table 1 also contains data on indicative spreads for 3-month 
swap quotations. In the pre-crisis normal time, swap spreads on the USDCHF would be 
around 0.4 pips. In the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers failure, this spread would be 
about 15 pips. The cost of trading for forward delivery widened by much more than the 
spot spreads. If one wanted to trade a currency forward, you had to pay a substantial 
premium compared to the pre-crisis period. 
  Table 2 contains a table constructed by RBS, that also appeared in an article in the 
Financial Times, documenting how trading changed on the electronic broker platforms 
EBS and Reuters. Comparing the pre-crisis period to the crisis period, one can see that 
there was more trading as the total number of transactions increased from 36 percent for 
the Mexican peso to 92 percent for the EURUSD. This might suggest that there was more 
liquidity, but there was actually less dollar value being traded in the crisis period than in 
the earlier period. The active trading during September-October 2008 may be thought of 
using the hot-potato analogy, where risk is the hot-potato that is passed from institution to 
institution until it finds a willing home. The hot potato was being passed faster than ever 
as no bank wanted to warehouse the intradaily risk as they normally would. The middle 
column of Table 2 shows that average spreads increased from 60 percent on euro and yen 
to 467 percent on the peso against USD. These are spreads calculated from the “inside 
spread” measured as the best bid and ask price existing on the screen at a point in time. 
The Table 1 spreads referred to quotes from a single bank but Table 2 spreads would be 
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expect the best bid and ask prices to be contributed by different institutions at any point 
in time. Finally, the increase in the volatility of the average spreads are shown in the last 
column of Table 2. Here the numbers are most dramatic and range from a low of 158 
percent for USDJPY to 5,500 percent for GBPUSD. The latter would be a fairly low 
volatility currency in normal times, but the pound sold off dramatically in the fall of 2008 
due to the macroeconomic environment, concern over U.K. banks, and the exposure of 
London to the financial industry. The high volatility of the spreads reflects the thin 
market trading conditions. If the top of the order book has smaller than normal quantities 
associated with prices, then a given trade would tend to take more liquidity out of the 
order book than normal and the best price on that side of the market would change by a 
larger amount than normal so that spreads widen correspondingly by larger amounts. 
  Besides the risk associated with making quotes in a high-volatility environment, 
there was also counterparty risk to be considered. If you had exposure to an institution 
that went bankrupt, you were liable to lose your investment with that institution. This 
would apply to currency traders and the banks or prime brokers that handle their trades. If 
a currency trading desk had 90 day forward contracts existing with a certain bank and 
that bank went bankrupt, then the contracts may not be settled. Worse still, suppose a 
hedge fund has cash at their prime broker, and the prime broker goes bankrupt. The 
hedge fund may not be able to receive payment of the funds the prime broker was  
holding. This is exactly what happened to Lehman Brothers clients. Lehman was an 
important prime broker for the hedge fund industry. After the bankruptcy, the U.K. courts 
took over the administration of Lehman debts. Unfortunately, in the U.K. such 
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Lehman owes them for years, if at all.  
  One of the more interesting anecdotes associated with the Lehman bankruptcy 
was the story of KfW, a German state bank, who transferred EUR300 million to Lehman 
Brothers on Monday, September 15 related to a swap agreement, after Lehman had 
announced its bankruptcy. As a result, KfW lost the principal related to their transfer.
2 
This event only served to underscore the settlement risk that exists in the market unless 
trades are settled in a payment-versus-payment system like the CLS system used for 
settling a significant fraction of FX trades. The post-Lehman world was one where 
financial institutions were monitoring counterparty exposures more carefully than ever, 
and some institutions, considered more at risk than others, found their client base 
shrinking.  
  For the foreign exchange market, counterparty risk meant managing closely your 
exposures to different trading partners. It also meant finding back-up prime brokers to 
reduce dependence on one bank. Given liquidity and counterparty concerns, one also 
observed a preference for trading shorter-maturity forwards, futures, and options 
contracts. Rather than hold a 90 day forward contract and pay the premium for the credit 
and volatility risk associated with that horizon, a 30 day contract would reduce the length 
of the exposure and be priced at a lower risk premium.  In addition, settlement risk 
resulted in more trades than ever being settled on the CLS system along with a significant 
increase in the funds, banks, and corporates seeking to join the CLS system. 
 
                                                 
2 see “KfW board members suspended over Lehman payment,” guardian.co.uk, September 19, 2008 or 
“Deutschlands duemmste bank!” Bild.de, September 18, 2008.   
  142.5 The Path of Exchange Rates 
Exchange rates moved in a wide range over the 2007-2008 period.  Figure 4 displays the 
exchange rates of the yen, euro, and British pound against the U.S. dollar. The values in 
Figure 4 are index values (where January 1, 2007 equals 1) of the price of one U.S. dollar 
in terms of each of the currencies. We see that until the first wave of the crisis in FX 
markets starting in August 2007, exchange rates were relatively stable. Following mid-
August, the euro began to appreciate steadily against the USD. For example, in mid-
August 2007 the dollar price of a euro was about 1.34. By mid-April 2008, the exchange 
rate was about 1.59. This was almost a 20 percent appreciation of the euro against the 
dollar. The euro traded within a relatively narrow range and stayed around this level until 
late July and then began a run of steady depreciation. By the end of October, the 
EURUSD exchange rate was about 1.25, a depreciation of about 22 percent. The early 
period was one where the U.S. subprime problems and aggressive Federal Reserve 
interest rate cuts were reflected in dollar weakness against the euro. The later period 
involved the flight-to-quality associated with the post-Lehman Brothers debacle and a 
strong sell-off of emerging markets, which benefited the USD. 
  Figure 4 illustrates that the Japanese yen was appreciating against the USD once 
the crisis began in August 2007. But after Bear Stearns sale and the appearance of more 
normal market conditions, the yen underwent a period of depreciation that ended in 
September 2008. In the post-Lehman world, the yen benefited from unwinding of carry 
trades where investors were short yen, and also from a view that the yen was a safe-haven 
currency. Certainly Japanese banks did not suffer from U.S. subprime exposure as did 
their competitors in Europe and the U.S. However, the news on the macro economy in 
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disappearing. 
  Finally, the British pound had remained remarkably stable relative to USD 
through the early waves of the crisis. This changed in the summer of 2008 as the depth of 
the problems in British banks was revealed and the market began to price in the 
deterioration in British economic conditions resulting from the magnitude of the 
employment and public finance aspects of the change in financial firms in the City of 
London. As firms downsized and payroll was cut, tax revenues were being cut at the 
same time that public spending was increasing.  The direct domestic impact of the decline 
in global financial market conditions is more important in the U.K. than anywhere else. 
 
2.6 The Aftermath and Predicted Implications for Liquidity 
The cost imposed by the financial crisis has resulted in a legislative and regulatory 
reaction to rein in risk-taking and speculative behavior. One implication has been to try 
and reduce compensation at banks that have accepted government assistance. In one 
instance, a U.K. bank paid no bonuses for 2008. The government reaction to the crisis is 
not surprising, but it is doubtful that those setting the rules fully understand the 
implications of the changes they are forcing on the financial industry. 
  The losses experienced by financial institutions did not come from foreign 
exchange trades. But the foreign exchange function is treated the same as other areas of 
the bank when it comes to compensation restrictions. We expect bank employees to 
respond in a predictable manner to a changed incentive structure. Since compensation is 
severely limited compared to the past, the risk/return tradeoff has changed in a manner 
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risk taking. For example, in the foreign exchange market, market making dealers are 
expected to provide liquidity to their counterparties and then manage the risk of their 
positions while earning a profit for their banks. Competition across banks resulted in tight 
spreads and a willingness to provide good two-way prices for large trade size. This 
willingness to bear risk on the “sell-side” was beneficial to the “buy-side” bank clients. In 
fact, given the large spreads reported in Tables 1 and 2 and the large volume of trading 
that occurred in 2008, bank profits from foreign exchange were very large. In fact, it was 
not uncommon to hear that a foreign exchange trader had their most profitable year ever 
in 2008. Yet, when bonuses were paid, they were substantially smaller than in past years. 
Given that they were paid much less than in the past for generating larger profits for a 
bank, we should expect these dealers to be less willing to warehouse the risk of carrying a 
currency inventory associated with their intraday trades. If they earn losses for the bank, 
they will be fired. If they generate large profits, they will not be paid a premium to 
reward successful risk taking.  So conservatism results and this has adverse effects on the 
bank counterparties. The dealers will likely charge wider spreads and deal in smaller 
amounts than in the past. This will lower the risk of the bank but impose greater costs on 
the banks’ clientele: non-bank financial institutions, corporate customers, governments, 
central banks, international travelers and others.   
  A predictable implication of the public policy response to the financial crisis is to 
lower liquidity and raise the risks and costs associated with non-bank currency trades. 
The “buy-side” faces greater costs associated with currency trading along with greater 
volatility of exchange rates.  It should be more difficult for non-banks to transfer their 
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the foreign exchange market than they used to. It is not clear that there is a net gain to 
society from these changes. 
 
3. A Global Financial Stress Index 
Although our analysis has centred on the foreign exchange market, we also analysed to 
what extent a global measure of financial stress would have captured or confirmed these 
effects. Accordingly, we constructed a general financial stress index (FSI) that is similar 
in some respects to the index recently proposed by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) (IMF, 2008).
3 One difference between the FSI we construct and the IMF version, 
however, is that, in operationalizing the FSI we do not use full-sample data in 
constructing the index  (e.g. by fitting generalised autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity, GARCH, models using the full-sample data or subtracting off full-
sample means). In other essential respects, however, our FSI is similar to the IMF version 
and we examine the same group of seventeen developed countries as in the IMF study, 
namely: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA. In 
contrast to the IMF analysis, however, we built a ‘global’ FSI based on an average of the 
individual FSI for each of these seventeen countries. 
  The FSI is a composite variable built using market-based indicators in order to 
capture four essential characteristics of a financial crisis: large shifts in asset prices, an 
abrupt increase in risk and uncertainty, abrupt shifts in liquidity and a measurable decline 
in banking system health indicators.  
                                                 
3 See also Illing and Liu (2006). 
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i)  The beta of banking sector stocks, constructed as the twelve-month rolling 
covariance of the year-over-year percent change of a country’s banking sector 
equity index and its overall stock market index, divided by the rolling twelve-
month variance of the year-over-year percent change of the overall stock 
market index. 
ii)  The spread between interbank rates and the yield on Treasury Bills, i.e. the so-
called TED spread that we discussed above: three-month LIBOR or 
commercial paper rate minus the government short-term rate. 
iii)  The slope of the yield curve, or inverted term spread: the government short-
term Treasury Bill yield minus the government long-term bond yield. 
 
In the securities market, a further three indicators were used: 
i)  Corporate bond spreads: the corporate bond yield minus the long-term 
government bond yield. 
ii)  Stock market returns: the monthly percentage change in the country equity 
market index. 
iii)  Time-varying stock return volatility. This was calculated as the square root of 
an exponential moving average of squared deviations from an exponential 
moving average of national equity market returns. An exponential moving 
average with a 36-month half-life was used in both cases. 
 
Finally, in the foreign exchange market: 
  19i)  For each country a time-varying measure of real exchange volatility 
was similarly calculated – i.e. the square root of an exponential 
moving average of squared deviations from an exponential moving 
average of monthly percentage real effective exchange rate changes. 
An exponential moving average with a 36-month half-life was used 
in both cases. 
 
  All components of the FSI are in monthly frequency and each component is 
scaled to be equal to 100 at the beginning of the sample. A national FSI index is 
constructed for each country by taking an equally weighted average of the various 
components. Then, a global FSI index is constructed by taking an equally weighted 
average of the seventeen national FSI indices. The calculated global FSI series runs from 
December 1983 until October 2008. 
  In order to ascertain whether an extreme value of the FSI has been breached, we 
scored the FSI by subtracting off a time-varying mean (calculated using an exponential 
moving average with a 36-month half-life) and dividing through by a time-varying 
standard deviation (calculated taking the square root of an exponential moving average, 
with a 36-month half-life, of the squared deviations from the time-varying mean). The 
resulting scored FSI gives a measure of the how many standard deviations the FSI is 
away from its time-varying mean.   
 
As can be seen from Figure 5, the global FSI crosses the threshold of one standard 
deviation above the mean for most of the major crises of the past twenty years or so, 
  20including the 1987 stock market crash, the Nikkei/junk bond collapse of the late 1980s, 
the 1990 Scandinavian banking crisis and the 1998 Russian default/LTCM crisis. The 
1992 ERM crisis is less evident at the global level. 
  Most interestingly, however, the global FSI shows a very marked effect during the 
current crisis. Mirroring the carry unwind in August 2007 that we documented above, 
there is a brief lull in the FSI as it drops below one standard deviation from its mean 
before leaping up again in November 2007 to nearly 1.5 standard deviations from the 
mean,. The global FSI then breaches the two-standard deviation threshold in January 
2008 and again in March 2008 (coinciding with the near collapse of Bear Stearns). With 
the single exception of a brief lull in May 2008, when the global FSI falls to about 0.7 
standard deviations above the mean, it then remains more than one standard deviation 
above the mean for the rest of the sample, spiking up in October to more than four 
standard deviations from the mean following the Lehman Brothers debacle in September. 
  It is tempting to infer from this analysis that an active currency manager could 
have significantly defended their portfolio by taking risk off (or perhaps even going short 
carry) in August 2007, especially as the carry unwind documented in Figure 1 is 
confirmed as a crisis point by the movements in the global FSI in the same month. We 
carried out a first exploration of this idea by estimating a Probit model of significant 
drawdowns from the carry trade investment as a function of the global FSI, where a 
“significant drawdown” is defined as greater than a one standard deviation negative 
return. Table 3 presents the estimation results. Clearly, the probability of a major 
drawdown from a carry trade investment is increasing in the FSI. Table 3 yields evidence 
  21of statistical significance of the effect of the FSI on the carry trade.
4 What about 
economic significance? 
  To examine the economic significance of the FSI effects on carry trade returns, 
we simulate the returns an investor would earn from investing in the Deutsche Bank 
Carry Return Index. Suppose the investor just invests in the index in an unconditional 
sense, without regard to market conditions. We will call this the “Unconditional Return.”  
Alternatively, the investor can invest in the index in “normal” periods and close out the 
position in stressful periods, where stress is measured by the global FSI. Specifically, 
when the FSI exceeds a value of 1, the carry trade exposure is shut off; otherwise, the 
investment is held. Figure 6 illustrates the cumulative returns to such strategies. The 
cumulative unconditional return is -1% while the conditional return is +38% over the 
period studied.  
  Our carry-trade horse race clearly indicates a superior performance of 
conditioning the carry trade investment on the FSI. In more familiar investment metrics, 
over the entire 2000-2008 period studied, the unconditional strategy yielded an 
information ratio (IR, measuring return per unit of risk) equal to -0.03 while the 
conditional return yields an IR of 0.69. Over the more recent 2005-2008 period, the 
unconditional IR is -0.66 while the conditional IR is 0.31. In this regard, we see that the 
FSI as a risk indicator has potential value to FX investments.  
  Caveats regarding this analysis are as follows:  
1) These results ignore transaction costs. This is important as when the FSI signals 
significant stress, market conditions are such that we should observe widespread carry 
                                                 
4 A consideration of factors that might control carry trade losses is receiving increased attention in the 
literature lately. Some examples are Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2008); Jurek (2007); and Clarida, 
Davis, and Pedersen (2009).  
  22trade unwinding. So an investor will face large one-sided market conditions that will lead 
to a much greater than normal cost of trading. Tables 1 and 2 provided indicative 
information on how much bid-ask spreads widened in the post-Lehman Brothers period. 
This is also indicative of what one might expect during a period of major carry unwind. 
Furthermore, investors seeking to sell out of their carry positions will face very thin 
offers on the other side of their trade. For instance, to close out the carry trade strategy of 
short yen (JPY), long New Zealand dollar (NZD) would involve buying JPY and selling 
NZD. But if there is great interest to do the same trade across the market, there will be 
very little flow interested in selling JPY and buying NZD, so market makers will price 
trades accordingly so that the price of exiting the carry trade will be much higher than in 
normal times. 
2) These results assume the carry trade exposure is eliminated in the same month that the 
FSI signals stress. There may be a lag between recognition of the market stress and 
exiting the position. If the carry trade exposure is eliminated in the month following the 
FSI signal of stress, the IR falls from 0.69 to 0.42 over the entire 2000-2008 sample 
period and from 0.66 to 0.00 over the recent 2005-2008 period. If the investor cannot 
recognize the shift to the stressful state in real time, it may be too late in many cases to 
reduce carry trade exposure. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The financial crisis of 2007-? has had major implications for the foreign exchange market. 
In the earlier part of this paper, we reviewed events and implications for exchange rates, 
volatility, returns to currency investing, and transaction costs. This “blow-by-blow” 
  23narrative is intended to be a resource for researchers seeking a comprehensive review of 
the “what, why and when” of the crisis in the foreign exchange market.  
  The crisis began in August 2007, when subprime-related turmoil in other asset 
classes finally spilled over into the currency market. This initial phase of the crisis was 
manifested in a major carry trade sell-off. Then in November 2007, credit restrictions 
were associated with a major deleveraging in financial markets and many investment 
funds were forced to liquidate positions. The next major wave of the crisis arrived in 
March 2008 with the near-failure of Bear Stearns. The treatment of Bear Stearns as “too 
big to fail” and the orderly takeover by JP Morgan Chase appeared to calm the market so 
that some semblance of normality returned to financial markets. The peak of the crisis (at 
least, so far) was the September 2008 failure of Lehman Brothers. By any metric, the 
crisis in the wake of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy was unlike anything that had 
preceded this period: volatility reached unseen levels, liquidity disappeared as 
counterparty risk reached unprecedented levels so that the cost of trading currencies 
skyrocketed and it became very difficult to trade any substantial size.  
  In the later part of the paper, we developed a financial stress index (FSI) that is an 
operationalized, global version of the FSI suggested by the IMF, and we then used the 
global FSI to illustrate the dramatic nature of the current crisis compared to earlier crises. 
We also examined how the global FSI might have been used to condition the exposure to 
the carry trade (long high interest rate currencies, short low interest rate currencies) and 
we showed that such an index has potential value in protecting a portfolio against loss 
during period of stress, although this result is subject to the important caveats of 
controlling for transaction costs and timely recognition of the change in regime. 
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 Table 1: FX Bid-Ask Spreads for  $50million: Comparing Normal to Post-Lehman Period 
Values are for risk-transfer trades in the range of $50-100 million, where a counterparty requests a two-way  price from a market-maker in a bilateral transaction. 
These should be considered representative of the periods under consideration. Larger trades would generally have wider spreads. Values are in “pips,” for 
instance if the spread on EURUSD is 1, then the spread would be something like 1.3530-1.3531. Both spot and 3-month forward swap spreads are given.  
 
  Pre-Crisis 2007 Period  Post-Lehman Crisis Period
  spot  3-mo swap   spot  3-mo swap
EURUSD  1  0.2    5  10 
 
GBPUSD  3  0.3    12  12 
 
USDJPY  3  0.2    12  10 
 
USDCHF  4  0.4    16  15 
 
AUDUSD  4  0.4    20  20 
 
USDCAD  4  0.3    20  30 
 




  2Table 2 
The Increase in FX Transactions and Spreads on Electronic Crossing Networks: Pre-crisis to Post-crisis 
The table shows the percentage change from the Sept-Oct 2007 period to the Sept-Oct 2008 period in a) the number of transactions in each currency pair, b) the 
average bid-offer spread, and c) the volatility of the spread as collected from the EBS and Reuters electronic brokerage systems. Source: RBS. 
 
 
  % increase in total transactions  % increase in avg bid-offer 
spread 
% increase in volatility of avg 
bid-offer spread 
EURUSD  92% 60% 336% 
USDJPY  58% 60% 158% 
GBPUSD 28%  293%  5500% 
AUDUSD 81%  127%  1212% 
USDMXN 36%  467%  715% 




  3Table 3 
Carry Trade Investment Drawdowns and the Financial Stress Index 
 
The table reports results of a Probit regression estimation of periods of significant negative returns to an investment in the Deutsche Bank Carry Index as a 
function of the Financial Stress Index (FSI). A significant drawdown is defined as a greater than 1 standard deviation (0.0247) negative return in a month.  The 





Dependent Variable: NEGRET     
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
    
Sample: 2000M01 2008M10     
Included observations: 106     
Convergence achieved after 5 iterations   
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
  Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic  Prob.  
constant -1.436662 0.196568 -7.308709 0.0000
FSI 0.446948 0.143449 3.115719  0.0018
McFadden R
2 0.142782     Mean of dependent variable  0.113208
S.D. of dep. variable  0.318352     S.E. of regression  0.290921
Akaike info criterion  0.643222     Sum of squared residuals  8.802070
Schwarz criterion  0.693476     Log likelihood  -32.09079
Hannan-Quinn criterion  0.663591     Restricted log likelihood  -37.43595
LR statistic  10.69033     Average log likelihood  -0.302743
Prob(LR statistic)  0.001077      
Obs. with NEGRET=0  94      Total obs.  106
Obs with NEGRET=1  12      
 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































  9Figure 6: The Returns to the Carry Trade 
The graph illustrates the cumulative returns to an investment in the Deutsche Bank Carry Index. In the unconditional case, the investor 
simply maintains the investment regardless of market conditions. In the conditioned case, the investment is shut off when the Global 
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